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The international business activities of state controlled enterprises appear to differ from those 
of otherwise comparable private-sector firms giving rise to issues that provide a basis for 
corrective policy actions. 
 
Key Points  
Rapid growth in international investment by state controlled enterprises (SCEs), particularly 
Chinese SCEs, has raised considerable public disquiet and policy challenges in a number of 
host countries. Examination of the issues associated with Chinese SCEs reveals grounds for 
policy concern with regard to transparency and accountability, the pursuit of non-commercial 
goals and the deployment of artificially created competitive advantages resulting from 
government subsidisation, preferential treatment, and structural distortions. In light of these 
concerns we discuss possible policy responses at the level of the home country, the host 
economy, and through international regulation.  










Patterns of international investment have experienced marked changes in the past decade 
(UNCTAD 2013). Two notable trends are the increasing role that new investment sources, 
particularly emerging markets play in terms of outward FDI (OFDI), as well as changes in the 
forms of international investment, most notably the rise of Sovereign Wealth Funds (SWFs) 
and international state-owned enterprises (SOEs). Much of this investment, both in new 
forms and from non-traditional sources, has targeted developed economies. For a number of 
potential recipient nations such investment raises novel issues and, in some cases, has 
triggered amendments to international investment policy. Of course there is a strong 
correlation between these two factors. Emerging markets, particularly the large BRIC 
countries, enjoy strong trade balances and rents from valued resources which have provided 
the foundation for major sovereign wealth funds. The China Investment Corporation (CIC) 
established in 2007 with assets of some US$200 billion from accumulated trade reserves has 
seen asset values double in the past five years. In addition, the particular institutional 
landscapes of these emerging markets are characterised by significant state involvement, both 
through direct ownership, political affiliation, and directive policy. The result is a growing 
importance of state controlled enterprises in international business. We can define state 
controlled enterprises as legal entities created by a government charged with undertaking 
commercial activities on behalf of the owner government.  
The concerns created by state controlled enterprises  in a number of host economies are based 
on the belief that SCEs may pursue objectives other than simply commercial success, that 
they enjoy competitive advantages denied to private firms, and that they could be a vehicle 
for the transfer of competing values and ideology (Meunier et. al. 2012). 
The intention of this paper is to explore these concerns and to investigate the conviction that 
international investment by SCEs warrants special treatment and targeted policy responses, 
from potential host economies. This is achieved through an examination of the growing 
significance of SCEs in the global economy, an analysis of sources of competitive advantage 
enjoyed by SCEs, and a discussion of the policy options for addressing the challenges created 
by SCEs. Because of the significant role that Chinese SCEs play in international investment, 
we focus on this specific source of investment. The final section offers concluding thoughts.    




The Significance of State Controlled Enterprises in International Business 
Over the past decade the significance of state controlled enterprises (SCEs) in international 
business has increased and the development of both SWFs and SOEs has been strongly 
associated with the rise of emerging markets as international investors. 
Sovereign Wealth Funds 
Sovereign wealth funds are government investment vehicles that are typically created by the 
accumulation of foreign exchange reserves (China, Singapore) or returns to resources such as 
oil (Kuwait, Russian Federation). They are managed independently of a country's monetary 
reserves and monetary authorities. Their objectives are the creation of future income flows 
through professional portfolio management.  
There are some 73 SWFs based in 46 countries. The assets held by SWFs have grown 
rapidly, doubling in value over the period 2000-2010. SWF assets were about $0.5 trillion in 
2003, reached $3 trillion by 2007 and currently exceed $7 trillion (Truman 2010; The 
CityUK 2015). While SWFs have shifted from passive to more active investors, particularly 
before the onset of the global financial crisis, they are still marginal players in foreign direct 
investment (FDI). Their share of assets in FDI is low with outward FDI stock of around $100 
billion, just 0.5 percent of the stock of world FDI in 2010 (Sauvant and Strauss 2012). SWFs 
have become involved in more cross-border mergers and acquisitions: while they were 
responsible for just one deal in 1987, this increased to 30 in 2007.  
 
State-Owned Enterprises 
Despite several decades of widespread economic deregulation and privatisation, state-
ownership remains significant in many countries, both developed and developing economies. 
Indeed, the number of state owned multinational enterprises increased by almost a third 
between 2010 and 2012 reaching 845. Their combined FDI outflows accounted for 11 percent 
of global FDI in 2012 (UNCTAD 2013). The share of such FDI from developing economies 
has increased as these firms seek strategic assets such as technology and brand names. 
Table 1 provides an indication of the extent of state control within the OECD group of 
countries.  




Table 1 Here 
 Table 1 shows that levels of state involvement and control of business is relatively low 
within the established OECD economies and is somewhat higher within the emerging OECD 
group. The United States which displays a strong ideological preference for private 
ownership and minimal control of business has by far the lowest levels of state involvement. 
This is in sharp contrast to the situation in Russia where state interference remains pervasive. 
The table suppresses considerable differences between nation states. For example, in Finland 
the assets of SOEs were equivalent to 80 percent of GDP, while levels of 25 percent were 
observed in France and Italy and around 20 percent in Korea and Turkey in the mid-2000s 
(OECD 2005).  
 More detailed information on patterns of state ownership of business in the large BRIC 
emerging markets is provided in Table 2.  
Table 2 shows that state ownership is comparatively high within the emerging BRIC 
economies, certainly much higher than levels within the OECD (Table 1). While there is 
some variation between the BRIC economies, SOEs characterised by a large government 
ownership stake are a key feature of the Chinese economy (Musacchio and Lazzarini 2012). 
Table 2 Here 
In comparison with SWFs, state-owned enterprises are much more significant international 
investors. UNCTAD lists more than 650 SOEs that control multinational operations 
(UNCTAD 2011). Of the 200 largest non-financial MNEs, 49 are SOEs with assets of $1.8 
trillion. More than half (29 of 49) are based in emerging markets. In 2010 some 11 percent of 
global FDI flows were accounted for by SOEs and they account for 6 percent of the total 
global FDI stock (UNCTAD 2011). They operate in a range of industrial sectors. With the 
growth of international investment from emerging markets, China has now become the 
world's third largest investor after the United States and Japan (UNCTAD 2013). 
We may expect the number of international SOEs to grow in the future, particularly as they 
are the primary vehicle for internationalisation in a number of large emerging economies 
including China and Russia, countries that are playing an increasingly significant role in total 
FDI (Sauvant and Strauss 2012). More than half of all SOEs are found in developing and 
transition economies and the BRIC economies in particular are major sources with Brazil 




accounting for 1.4 percent of the total number of SOEs worldwide, Russia, 2.1 percent , India 
3.1 percent, and China 7.7 percent. Between 2003 and 2010 outward FDI by SOEs accounted 
for one third of all outflows from developing and transition economies (UNCTAD 2011). 
 
The Competitive Position of SCEs  
The growth of state controlled international investment has generated considerable disquiet in 
a wide range of host economies. Table 3 provides a brief overview of the types of concerns 
that have been expressed about both SWFs and SOEs. 
Table 3 Here 
Table 3 highlights a number of concerns that host country governments and commentators 
have expressed regarding both SWFs and SOEs. From the table it is apparent that some 
concerns, for example, the negative influence of home country characteristics, a lack of 
accountability and transparency, and the possible pursuit of non-commercial objectives, are 
common to both types of SCE. However, it is also clear that other concerns exist that are 
unique to the particular type of SCE, whether SWF or SOE. Furthermore, these concerns 
stem from a variety of sources and could be classified as institutional, structural, strategic or 
distortionary. We discuss these concerns in more detail.   
The first concern, and a shared one, is that SCEs are shaped by the characteristics of their 
home environments and that undesirable features of the home country are presumed to be 
transferred through the investment process. There is certainly evidence that international 
businesses are, at least in part, a product of their home environment (Nachum 2003; Porter 
1990; Zheng and Tan 2011). The key traits identified in emerging and transition economies 
are underdeveloped market institutions, poor human rights records, and low environmental 
standards. Host country concerns highlight the likely structural and behavioural differences of 
investors based in non-market economies. Because of incomplete markets or underdeveloped 
institutions such firms develop distinct structures (multi-product and conglomerate forms 
(Khanna and Yafeh 2007) and place greater reliance on government links and support 
(Khanna et. al 2005). This is seen as likely to be distortionary in a developed market 
economy. The poor human rights records of some emerging markets, both within the 




workplace and society in general, with poor public accountability, a repressed media and lack 
of political democracy, are seen as alien and undesirable values. Because of presumed close 
ties to their home country governments, international investments by SCEs are assumed to 
embody source country values and objectives to a greater extent than might be expected 
within private firms. Of course there is no inevitability that such values are reproduced, 
particularly when investment motives (market, resource, asset seeking) are diverse. For 
example, it would be reasonable to expect market-seeking investors to be more responsive to 
local (host) market conditions if they are to be successful and less likely to emphasise home 
country values. The reverse might be true of resource seeking firms, particularly those 
charged with strengthening home country security of supply. At the very least the investing 
firm is bound by local (host) country laws, regulations and standards. 
A second shared concern is an apparent lack of transparency and accountability by SCEs. Of 
particular concern has been the limited information that is provided by SWFs and some 
SOEs. Analysis of these concerns suggests a number of principles that SCEs should adhere 
to, focusing on providing greater insights into issues such as the investors policy objectives 
and investment strategies, links between the government and managers of the investing 
entity, as well as greater transparency on investment strategies and outcomes. Measures of 
SWF transparency, both the Lunaburg-Maduall index and the Truman rankings show 
considerable variation between funds in terms of disclosure (Truman 2007). 
A third concern regarding SCEs is the likelihood that they enjoy economies of scale as well 
as an ability to hold stakes in overseas ventures for the long-run. Where individual or 
institutional investors might move funds frequently in response to changing returns and 
opportunities, SCEs may benefit from state involvement by having access to lower cost funds 
or from being able to hold unprofitable positions where returns are not demanded in the short 
term.  
Fourth, and one of the most widely discussed concerns, is that SCEs may pursue objectives 
other than wealth maximisation. Their links to national governments create the possibility 
that they may act as agents of the state pursuing political and strategic ends. It is difficult to 
conceive of such deviation in practice where SWFs are charged with maintaining or 
increasing wealth and SOEs are required to act as 'national champions'. A single instance of 
such behaviour being proved would destroy most, if not all, of a company's international 




equity. The Chinese telecom giant Huawei offers an interesting example of a company that 
has been accused of close links with the Chinese state, denied access to broadband contracts 
in Australia, and thwarted in its attempts to acquire US high-tech companies, but which has 
not had to address any genuine evidence of wrongdoing (Economist 2012).  
In the case of SWFs there are a number of other areas which generate concern in recipient 
nations. One is the fear that SWFs could gain control of critical assets or infrastructure. The 
attempted acquisition of Auckland International Airport by the Canada Pension Plan 
Investment Board in 2008 led to a widespread debate within New Zealand as to what 
constituted a strategic asset. A related concern is that SWFs might target newly privatised 
businesses. The fear here is that SWFs as controlling investors may lack the technical, 
managerial and industrial experience to successfully manage the assets. In such a case the 
(potential) gains from privatisation might be lost. Again, it is hard to imagine a SWF taking a 
controlling stake in a particular enterprise if it lacked the necessary capability or could not 
contract in the relevant skills. More likely is a scenario where a SWF takes a sizeable but 
minority position, and puts indirect pressure on management to the detriment of performance.  
Other features of SWFs worth noting are their marked geographical and sectoral composition. 
Almost three-quarters of SWF investment is in developed countries, principally the UK, US 
and Germany, with the majority found in the services sector (UNCTAD 2008). Such 
concentration could create the perception that these funds were more sizeable than they 
actually are.  
SWFs are also seen as potentially unstable. They are acutely sensitive to changing economic 
conditions which can impact on both their source (trade surpluses or high commodity prices) 
as well as returns. A number of SWFs suffered sharp falls in the value of their assets as a 
result of the global financial crisis (UNCTAD 2010). Finally, where SWFs operate under 
conditions of weak governance, such as Papua New Guinea or Vietnam, there is a possibility 
that they could be mismanaged reducing wealth (Truman 2011). At the same time attitudes 
towards SWFs seem to be sensitive to overall economic conditions and a number of potential 
host countries appear to have become more receptive towards such investment immediately 
after the global economic crisis (Fotak and Megginson 2009).      




When we turn to SOEs, as well as the shared concerns, there are other distinctive issues. A 
widely aired concern is that SOEs are in essence instruments of government policy and as 
such, may be required to pursue non-commercial goals. A number of governments use their 
SOEs to gain access to critical supplies of natural resources such as oil or minerals. Others 
foster the development of internationally competitive enterprises through some form of 
industrial policy. In such cases favoured SOEs are often the vehicles for global expansion. 
This has certainly been the case with China's Go Global policy (Luo et.al. 2010; Peng et. al. 
2008). In other cases home country governments may facilitate the overseas entry of their 
SOEs by linking aid and development assistance to project approval. These government to 
government relationships work to reduce political risk and transactions costs, increasing the 
attractiveness of investment into high risk activities and locations. The rapidly changing 
nature of Chinese outward foreign direct investment may reflect the likelihood that it is, at 
least to some degree, driven by political and strategic considerations. Chinese resource-
seeking shows discernible waves, in part because of rejections, from North America and 
Australia and increasingly towards parts of Africa and Latin America (Scissors 2011). The 
spike in Chinese investment into land and food production following the world food price 
rises of 2008 (Anseeuw et. al. 2012) would also appear to be politically prompted.  
There is increasing research support for a second concern regarding SOE investors - that they 
may not be representative of the larger pool of all firms (both private and state-owned). This 
concern is part of a wider set of issues that build on the idea that SOEs enjoy competitive 
advantages stemming solely from their ownership status. Recent work suggests that such 
concerns may have an empirical foundation and may be quite subtle in their operation. Wang 
et. al. (2012) report evidence that internationalising SOEs from China are more likely to 
possess stronger marketing and technological resources as well as capabilities, than purely 
domestic SOEs. These firms would appear to be in a much stronger position to succeed in 
overseas markets and to achieve government objectives such as technology acquisition and 
transfer as well as in overcoming marketing challenges. This research also suggests that it is 
state involvement and not simply state ownership that drives this selection bias. Firms that 
were state affiliated also benefitted when internationalising (Wang et. al. 2012).   
There is considerable disquiet regarding not simply selection bias which results from state 
ownership, but a pervasive concern that the state may contribute to many of the apparent 




competitive advantages that SOEs enjoy. This is the basis for the argument for 'competitive 
neutrality' within the public sector (OECD 2009). Competitive neutrality can be defined as 
the creation of a legal and regulatory environment designed to ensure that all enterprises - 
public and private - are subject to the same rules and regulations and that government 
affiliation does not confer unjustified advantages. 
However, governments face strong incentives to ensure that their SOEs succeed, both 
domestically and internationally. This bias occurs despite the more general role of that of the 
state as a regulator of business activity. While government created privileges contribute to the 
creation of competitive advantages in the home country, many of these same advantages can 
be deployed in international markets, mirroring the significance of internationally 
transferable firm-specific advantages in explaining international operations (Dunning 1988). 
State support of SOE competitiveness operates both directly and indirectly. It can persist 
despite the trend towards subjecting SOEs to greater market discipline and accountability 
through mandating commercial returns and increased corporatisation. The basis of concerns 
in this area is the fact that generally the resulting competitive advantages do not reflect 
underlying efficiencies, rather they are artificial and welfare reducing. 
Directly, the state can impact on SOE competitiveness in a number of ways. First, SOEs can 
enjoy significant subsidisation through the provision of concessionary financing. Where 
funds are provided to SOEs from other state controlled financial organisations the terms of 
such funding may be subsidised with capital costs held below market rates, generous write 
off of interest charges, as well as the provision of state guarantees which effectively lower 
borrowing costs. Differential bankruptcy rules may be used to enable SOEs to carry losses for 
a significant period, effectively extending their planning horizons when compared with 
private businesses. 
Second, other forms of subsidisation may be enjoyed by SOEs including direct subsidies to 
sustain operations as well as exemptions from certain taxes or business regulations. Other 
benefits include favourable provision of resources such as land and critical infrastructure. All 
forms of subsidisation artificially lower the operating costs of SOEs enabling them to price 
more competitively than less favoured rivals.  




Third, preferential treatment by governments may also benefit SOEs. Such treatment might 
include the provision to SOEs of commercially valuable information, particularly on overseas 
market opportunities, favoured status in public procurement processes, and exemption from 
anti-trust legislation.  
Fourth, SOEs may also benefit from an exclusive or monopoly position, particularly 
important in activities characterised by extensive economies of scale. They may be sheltered 
from full competitive pressure when foreign investors or import competing products are 
restricted. Even where competition exists, incumbency advantages of SOEs can be used to 
impose less favourable entry conditions on potential competitors. Such advantages increase 
the relative competitiveness of favoured firms.  
Governments can also contribute to the creation of SOE competitive advantage indirectly. 
Generally, such effects operate through business structure and incentive systems. The 
structural distortion most evident with SOEs is the issue of captive equity. Because equity 
within an SOE is effectively locked in government hands, transfer of ownership and control 
of an SOE is much lower than that of an otherwise comparable private firm. The absence of a 
takeover threat reduces the incentive for SOE management to operate at optimal efficiency 
since they face few effective sanctions. They may engage in anti-competitive behaviour with 
little fear of declining stock values or pressure for management change. SOEs may also be 
absolved from making commercial returns and dividend payments if they are empowered to 
pursue other (non-commercial) objectives. Where SOEs are not subject to market discipline 
they may face soft budget constraints which could provide a rationale for pursuing aggressive 
growth or internationalisation. In such cases we might observe greater intensity of outward 
FDI or earlier internationalisation of SOEs than would be seen in otherwise comparable 
private firms. We might also observe a willingness to overpay for acquired assets. Incumbent 
SOE managers may enjoy high levels of freedom when they face little pressure on their 
positions. In some cases the government owners will display a preference for internal 
promotion or the transfer of staff from other branches of the public sector. Mechanisms for 
changes in management are attenuated by a so-called 'third agency problem' which arises 
because the public, the ultimate owners of SOEs, can only vote for change indirectly through 
national elections which may be less than transparent in some cases.  




Further indirect competitive distortions could arise when SOEs are used as elements of 
industrial or development policy. In a number of emerging markets - particularly China, 
Russia and Brazil - SOEs are used to foster certain types of economic activity such as critical 
capabilities or the development of key technologies which are interpreted as being in the 
broader national interest. This type of activity is embodied in proactive industrial policy, a 
framework for government funded or supported initiatives designed to promote economic 
growth and development, an approach widely adopted in economies such as Taiwan and 
South Korea (Amsden 2001; Wade 1990). In the development context such policy and role 
for SOEs can be justified as an attempt to correct for market failure where private agents are 
unable or unwilling to fund such activities. State intervention may be seen as necessary to 
capture externalities and to signal new opportunities to the market.  
For a number of developed economies state ownership may find favour as a way of 
preserving and protecting national competitors in what may be termed critical, strategic or 
national interest industries. Government interventionism in France, particularly since around 
2002, has seen attempts to restructure nationally strategic industries such as pharmaceuticals, 
protect individual firms like Danone, and even keep car manufacturing jobs in the home 
country.   
 
The Challenges of Chinese State Controlled Enterprises 
Chinese state controlled enterprises are of particular interest for a number of reasons. On the 
one hand they display many of the general characteristics that are associated with all SCEs; 
on the other hand, they also reveal distinct and challenging aspects.  
One distinctive aspect is the rapid rate of international growth of China's international 
investment. China's FDI has grown strongly since 2006, in part as a result of government 
encouragement, with the stock doubling between 2009 and 2012. China's outward FDI flows 
increased five-fold between 2006 and 2014, reaching $116bn, while the stock reached 
$730bn, a nine-fold increase since 2006 (UNCTAD 2015). Since more than 80 percent of 
China's overseas investment is undertaken by SOEs (Morck et. al 2008), the growth has been 
remarkable.  Strong growth is also expected to continue with any slowing in the domestic 
economy increasing the attractiveness of international investment. Indeed, China is expected 




to reverse its current situation to become a net exporter of capital (OFDI exceeding IFDI) in 
the next few years.  
The timing of China's rapid internationalisation has also raised concerns. At the time of the 
Global Financial Crisis, Chinese firms with high levels of liquidity enjoyed opportunities to 
pick up distressed assets from cash strapped businesses. In the past five years Chinese firms 
have been active in acquiring assets in banking, insurance, mining and property, including 
New York's Cassa Hotel. This type of investment, despite the fact that it brings much needed 
capital to distressed firms,  has fuelled resentment in a number of potential host economies.   
A third area of concern with Chinese investment relates to their strategic behaviour. As late 
entrants and relatively inexperienced investors, their decision making is not always consistent 
with host country expectations (Wong 2012). In a number of cases Chinese firms have 
seemingly over-paid for assets, although this might be welcomed by host country sellers. In 
other cases they have appeared extremely naive in their practices.  In the case of Chinalco's 
failed bid for Australia's Rio Tinto, the Chinese firm failed to understand the perceived 
strategic importance of Rio Tinto within Australia, and subsequent opposition (Yao et. al. 
2010). Similarly, CNMC withdrew its bid for Lynas Rare Earth when it realised it would not 
be granted a majority board position. The Chinese state-owned Minmetals bid for OZ 
Minerals was never going to be allowed when one acknowledges the proximity of the 
company's main mine to Australia's weapons testing centre at Woomera. Similar 
shortcomings are apparent in other Chinese investments in mining where investors failed to 
realise that responsibility for major infrastructure was that of the mine operator and not the 
local government. At the same time many Chinese investors have struggled to accept the 
well-established expectation that engineering, construction, procurement and management 
work in the mining sector is awarded to local contractors. Such misunderstandings cause both 
confusion and difficulty in estimating likely investment returns.     
The preference for mergers and acquisitions characteristic of much Chinese overseas 
investment is a further source of contention. The perception in many host economies is that 
such investments in existing assets contribute much less than greenfield (or new) investment. 
For this reason there are likely to be higher levels of opposition, or more demanding tests of 
acceptance, for such ventures. These concerns are heightened when investors target what are 
regarded as 'strategic' industries. Definitions of what constitute 'strategic' assets vary between 




countries and over time, but often encompass energy and power, telecommunications, 
banking and rare minerals.  
Concerns are also expressed over the distinct characteristics and advantages enjoyed by 
Chinese state-controlled firms. These include their concentration in what are widely regarded 
as globally strategic sectors (defence, petroleum, telecommunications, aviation, automobiles 
and shipping), their opaque governance structures, ongoing and pervasive government 
support and subsidisation as well as their ability to make massive investments in public 
relations and meeting net benefit tests in host economies. Because regulators may find it 
difficult to separate Chinese SOEs from the Chinese state, such investors may be hampered 
by their connections to the state (Cui and Jiang 2012), the massive power advantage that 
China enjoys over many potential host countries (Duanmu 2014) and perceived asymmetry in 
market access. For example, while Chinese investors are able to purchase agricultural land in 
New Zealand, New Zealand firms are denied the same opportunities in China. Related 
concerns regarding reciprocity have been expressed in Canada (Dobson 2014). 
 
Policy Responses to International Investment by State Controlled Enterprises 
We have argued that international investment by state-controlled enterprises, particularly 
those from emerging economies such as China, has become both more significant in recent 
years and is likely to increase in the near future. For this reason it is imperative that host 
country governments ensure appropriate policy responses to what many see as novel and 
challenging forms of FDI. We can usefully distinguish between three sets of policy 
responses: one focusing at the home country level; one at the international level; and a third 
grounded in the host country. However, it is also important to recognise that there is a school 
of thought that argues that such investors do not raise any novel regulatory challenges and 
should not be treated any differently to other international investors (Globerman and Shapiro 
2009; Globerman 2015).  
This position is based on a view that market pressures force state-owned enterprises to 
behave in ways that mirror private enterprises precluding the pursuit of non-commercial or 
political objectives. While it is accepted that SOEs may impose costs (negative externalities) 
that might result from their labour or environmental practices or lack of transparency, it is 




assumed that these can be addressed by existing regulatory policies in most host economies. 
This view, of course, assumes the efficient operation of market forces, bestows a high level of 
capability on national regulatory bodies, and discounts secondary spillover effects. There is 
some indirect evidence to suggest that the strategic choices of SOEs do differ from those of 
private firms. For example, one study found that SCEs were more likely to invest in 
economies with a poor rule of law or high level of corruption, perhaps because of a moral 
hazard problem which leads the managers of such firms to believe that the state will be more 
willing to assist them in the face of difficulties (Knutsen et.al. 2011).   
Home Country Policies 
It may appear unusual to suggest that policy responses to FDI should focus on the home 
countries of investors. However, as we discussed above, it is here that the distinctive 
characteristics of these investment forms are forged, so it follows that they can also be 
changed. In effect, if SCEs can be subjected to reforms in their source country they may be 
seen as less novel and challenging to investment regulators and policy makers in the host 
country. 
A number of useful home country policy reforms can be identified (Musacchio and Lazzarini 
2012). The first would be further privatisation. Renewed privatisation could push SCEs closer 
to the profile of private sector investors reducing their idiosyncrasies. There are likely to be 
several constraints on such moves. In many of the important SCE emerging home economies 
such as Russia and China, there is strong ideological commitment to state involvement and 
hence, reluctance to reducing such involvement. Similarly, there is evidence that even after a 
programme of privatisation some state influence is likely to remain. A study of OECD 
countries pursuing privatisation after 2000 found governments retained some degree of 
control over almost two-thirds of their privatised businesses (Bortolloti and Faccio 2009).  
A second strategy would be to rely on home country regulation to ensure that SCEs operate  
as efficiently and effectively as possible, ideally at a level similar to that of otherwise 
comparable private firms. The heart of such policy would be competition regulation. 
Providing a competitive environment matched with appropriate incentives could alter SCE 
behaviour. Unfortunately, there are significant policy challenges when regulating SCEs. One 
is the likelihood of general competition policy conflicting with sectoral regulation and 




protection. As highlighted earlier, SCEs are frequently found in strategic sectors and may 
enjoy special treatment. Generic competition policy is founded on the belief that firms are 
pursuing the goal of profit maximisation. This may not be the case for SCEs charged with 
social goals such as income redistribution or employment creation. Effective competition 
policy is also constrained by the difficulty of obtaining information on the operations of 
SCEs. They may not be required to match the accounting and disclosure standards of private 
sector firms when information disclosure is geared towards public expenditure management 
rather than sound corporate governance. The complexity of many SCEs, being multi-product 
or industry, can create difficulties when practices such as cross-subsidisation occur. 
Furthermore, the imposition of competition policy to ensure neutrality may not be justified in 
all cases. During the recent global financial crisis a number of government have felt that the 
social welfare benefits of bailing out banks and leading businesses have outweighed the 
advantages of adhering to strict competitive neutrality. Such crisis situations may attenuate 
the case for the strict enforcement of competition policy.  
A third home country response would be to improve the standards of disclosure and 
transparency of SCEs. The fundamental changes would focus on disclosure of the non-
commercial objectives that SCEs are charged with as well as the forms and levels of any 
subsidisation they enjoy. In addition, home country governments need to carefully delineate 
their role as stakeholders in state controlled enterprises from their regulatory and policy roles 
affecting the performance of such firms. Disclosure and transparency also benefit from 
consistent incentive systems and adherence to high standards of commercial decision making, 
shielded, where possible, from political interference.     
A fourth strategy would be to move the management and decision-making processes of SCEs 
away from the perception of a traditional public sector model. Ways to achieve this include 
ensuring an open and competitive market in the recruitment of managers into SCEs as well as 
the appointment of independent and accountable directors to SCE boards.   
Fifth, there are also significant opportunities for increasing the acceptance of SCEs as 
international investors through the reform of corporate governance. Widely discussed reforms 
in this area include the separation of commercial and non-commercial objectives of SCEs and 
a continuing assurance that they face all normal business costs. Other changes would, again, 
mimic structures and processes characteristic of private firms. The increased use of 




professional managers employed under conditions that permit bonus payments or promotions 
based on performance and merit could change behaviour radically. Such performance-
contingent contracts are now widely adopted in Chinese SOEs (Bai and Xu 2005; Mengistae 
and Xu 2004). Public listing of SCEs perhaps through the sale of minority state shareholdings 
would increase information disclosure through the prospectus process and enable greater 
monitoring of performance by external minority investors. It may also be useful to implement 
legal changes that protect the interests of minority shareholders particularly where a SCE 
pursues multiple goals. However, the trade-offs in this area appear far from simple 
(Pargendler 2012).  
China represents perhaps the most comprehensive attempt to reform its SOE sector in an 
attempt to change the behaviour of its firms.  Liang et. al. (2015) highlight two principal 
forms of institutional environment in China's development: administrative and market-
oriented. Administrative institutions emphasise political connections and suggest a close 
alliance between SOE management and state interests. In contrast, market oriented 
institutions focus on ownership arrangements and the development of pecuniary incentives 
consistent with international and private sector experience (Peng 2003). Reforms have 
focused on deregulation of input prices, particularly interest rates, increased competition from 
non-state firms, and raising dividend payments. Property rights have been much more clearly 
defined while SOE governance arrangements have become more consistent with international 
practices including the appointment of independent directors and greater consistency in the 
selection of directors (Megginson and Netter 2001). Recent analysis shows that Chinese 
SOEs have changed their globalisation strategies in light of the reforms suggesting that 
Chinese SOEs show greater convergence with private sector MNEs after the reforms (Liang 
et. al. 2015;  Ralston et.al. 2006). 
It is worth noting that source country reforms should not simply be considered in isolation. 
There are likely to be important interactions between them. For example, sound corporate 
governance complements effective privatisation since it enhances the commercial value of 
businesses increasing their attractiveness in the market. 
 
International Regulation 




Proposals for the international regulation of SCEs have focused primarily on SWFs, chiefly 
because of their novelty to many host economies. In 2008 a set of principles known as the 
Santiago Principles were released by the International Working Group of Sovereign Wealth 
Funds under the auspices of the IMF. The Group offered a set of 24 principles and practices 
within a voluntary framework subject to home country laws and regulations. Their focus, not 
surprisingly, was on the very concerns that host governments had expressed - issues such as 
appropriate governance and accountability, desirable investment practices, and improved 
information transparency.    
At the same time the OECD has been working to strengthen principles for foreign investment 
from a wide range of organisations, but again with a focus on SWFs. The principles 
highlighted include those that have long been applied to all forms of foreign investment - 
non-discrimination, transparency, investment barriers, disclosure of investment decisions, and 
regulatory proportionality in the face of national security issues (OECD 2008) . 
The OECD position is, in essence, that existing investment instruments provide the 
fundamental assurance that any international investor - private, state-owned or SWF - 
requires. The principles of fair treatment of foreign investors based on non-discrimination, 
transparency of investment restrictions, liberalisation of capital movements and legitimate 
national security concerns, provide a predictable and manageable environment irrespective of 
the particular form of the investor. In other words, the issues that SWF and SOE investment 
creates can be accommodated under existing investment instruments. The underlying 
principle is to ensure adherence to these regulations within an open investment environment 
that has been put under considerable strain from both the global financial crisis and the rise of 
non-traditional international investors. 
The OECD is anxious to avoid investment measures aimed at SCE investors because they 
could have a negative impact on private investors when investment laws do not sufficiently 
distinguish between the two groups of international investor.  
While initiatives in this area by the OECD are to be welcomed they carry some obvious 
limitations. First, such regimes are non-binding and are subject to appropriate implementation 
by national governments. The likelihood of achieving binding regulations is low. Second, 
concerns with globalisation and changing patterns of competitive advantage mean that 




commitment to capital liberalisation is not as strong as it was in the 1990s. The growth of 
protectionist policies and the promotion of national security and strategic interests means that 
enforcement of guidelines is unlikely to be pervasive (Enderwick 2011). Third, the OECD as 
a grouping has obvious geographical limitations and does not directly encompass the BRIC 
economies, a major source of concern with regard to SCE international investment.  
Host Country Policies 
Host country policies to deal with the challenges of SCEs are of particular interest because it 
is here that most of the anxiety and opposition the such investments has been generated. We 
can usefully classify host country responses into four main areas: tackling public opposition; 
improving the competitive operating environment; the imposition of specific requirements; 
and regulatory amendments. 
Tackling Public Opposition  
In many host economies there is an absence of well founded debate on the benefits and 
challenges of international investment from non-traditional investors. This creates a void 
which may be filled by political or media invective, much of it highly critical. Campaigns 
based on improving the quality of public debate, developing a public relations campaign to 
highlight potential benefits, or emphasising mixed models of control could be useful in 
attenuating public opposition. An interesting example is provided in the case of Brazil which 
is plays an increasingly significant role in international investment as both a home and host 
nation. The Brazilian Development Bank (BNDES) was charged with not only managing 
Brazil's comprehensive privatisation programme but also took a minority stake in a number 
of companies (Musacchio and Lazzarini 2012) enabling the creation of mixed enterprises, 
with elements of private, state and foreign ownership, and reducing concerns that newly 
privatised assets would simply fall into foreign hands (De Paula et.al. 2002).   
 
Improving the Competitive Operating Environment  
A second host country policy response to non-traditional investment would be to accept the 
entry of SCEs but to attempt to create an operating environment that forces such firms to 
behave in ways expected of purely private firms and which minimises the distortionary 




competitive advantages SCEs  might possess. Central to such a policy would be maximising 
competitive pressure through the elimination of exclusive rights, the minimisation of licenses 
and other authorisations, opening up public procurement to all firms and easing entry of new 
competitors. Such a policy would tolerate international investment by SCEs but attempt to 
neutralise any non-efficiency based competitive advantages enjoyed by such firms. In a 
highly global economy pressure to change the behaviour of dominant SCEs could come from 
a variety of sources. An interesting example is provided by the Russian state-owned gas 
monopoly Gazprom which has seen its dominant market position challenged as other 
producers such as the United States develop countervailing advantage through shale gas 
production.  
 
The Imposition of Specific Conditions  
A third, and increasingly utilised policy stance, has been to approve international investment 
by non-traditional investors, but to link approval to a number of specific conditions that must 
be met. Such a policy is based on the view that these types of investment are somehow 
different, and while not requiring a separate regulatory regime or process, do raise novel 
challenges. There have been a number of recent cases, albeit not always involving SCEs, 
which illustrate the length to which some host governments will go to. In a recent New 
Zealand case approval was given to a Chinese buyer to acquire a significant parcel of dairy 
land. Approval was conditional on the company meeting some 27 additional conditions 
including the provision of scholarships, the creation of an on-farm training school, investment 
in heritage sites and for the principals to be of continuing good character (Enderwick and 
Nagar 2012). In a second case, the acquisition of a sizeable Australian cotton farm by a 
Chinese company, the purchaser was required to sell down their stake to 51 percent within 
three years, to engage in arm's length trading of any cotton, and for the property to be 
operated and managed by the Australian company using the existing workforce. More 
bizarrely, when Australian mining giant BHP attempted to acquire Canada's PotashCorp, the 
company offered a number of conditions including a willingness to forego tax benefits, to 
remain a member of the Canpotex potash export consortium for five years, and even establish 
its global headquarters in Canada (Walker 2012).   




    
Regulatory Amendments    
A fourth response adopted by a number of countries has been prompted by a belief that 
existing regulations do not provide adequate security for SCEs and their growth means that 
new or amended regulations are required. A number of countries including the United States, 
Germany, Russia and Australia have followed this route (Truman 2010). We briefly consider 
two examples. 
The United States foreign investment review process based on its interagency Committee on 
Foreign Investments in the United States (CIFUS) was amended in 2007 through the Foreign 
Investment and National Security Act (FINSA) to strengthen approval processes and to place 
greater weight on national security concerns. A  key feature of the legislative change was to 
toughen CIFUS examination of transactions involving SCE investors. The change also 
empowered CIFUS to impose and enforce any conditions necessary to mitigate national 
security concerns. The legislative change has been viewed positively in one important sense - 
by strengthening the review process it helps reduce the political uncertainty that surrounds 
international transactions. While there has been an increase in the number of cases considered 
under the FINSA changes from 2009, there is little evidence to suggest that it is impeding 
foreign investment into the United States.  
Germany also amended its foreign investment review processes in 2009 to allow the Federal 
Ministry to review foreign investments and provided powers to suspend or prohibit 
transactions (involving 25 percent or more of voting rights) that threaten national security or 
public order. The legislation does not explicitly distinguish between private and public 
investors. The new powers appear to have been applied carefully and between April 2009 and 
December 2011 no foreign acquisitions of a German company were suspended or prohibited 
(Jost 2012).  
 
Conclusions  
In this paper we have considered policy responses to the challenge of FDI by state controlled 
enterprises, with a particular focus on Chinese firms. The rapid internationalisation of such 




firms appears to be creating regulatory challenges for a number of host economies. The issue 
is also of critical importance to Chinese policy makers who place considerable reliance on 
China's large SOEs to achieve ambitious internationalisation targets.  
Our discussion suggests a number of conclusions. First, we have argued the there has been 
strong growth in international investment by SCEs and that these non-traditional investors 
create novel issues for host country investment approval agencies.  All the available evidence 
seems to support the view that SCEs are playing an increasingly important role in 
international business and anecdotal evidence shows widespread public disquiet with this 
type of investment.  
Second, our discussion offers considerable support to the view that SCE investors do create 
novel policy challenges. Of particular concern are poor levels of transparency and 
accountability and the pursuit of non-commercial goals. In the case of SOEs, in the absence 
of pervasive competitive neutrality, there is evidence that SOEs may enjoy non-efficiency 
based competitive advantages generated through subsidisation, preferential treatment and 
structural distortions. Home governments, directly or indirectly, are responsible for these 
competitive distortions.  
Third, because these challenges are real in many cases, policy responses may be desirable. 
We suggest that these may occur within the home country (altering SCE behaviour to bring 
them closer to the model of private firms), at the international level, and most controversially, 
within targeted host countries. Reforms at these different levels are likely to be 
complementary. However, the picture is complicated by the dynamic nature of institutional 
reform within emerging economies such as China. Over time, it appears that the strategies of 
Chinese SOEs for example, are likely to show greater convergence with private sector 
practices.  
Fourth, our discussion reveals some limitations of current work and suggests several fruitful 
research paths. We have given little consideration to other, generally protectionist, policy 
responses such as France's decision to designate a number of industry sectors as strategic and 
hence closed to foreign investors. Similarly, other potential host nations have created 'golden 
shares' that give existing holders the power to veto foreign investment, or the creation of so-
called 'white knights' - state supported investment funds that hold available equity in key 




firms and sectors to prevent foreign acquisition. These responses are worthy of more detailed 
examination.  
Even modest regulatory revisions could be useful in bringing policy clarity. Current foreign 
investment policy regimes are based on ownership while it is company behaviour which is 
critical in determining the impacts of FDI. A shift in policy focus, coupled with greater 
corporate transparency, would be valuable. Such a shift would place greater demands on the 
capability of regulators who would need to develop an enhanced understanding of economic 
and business conditions in source economies. Similarly, recent research insights need to be 
incorporated into policy decision making. For example, Liang et. al. (2015) find that while 
the state is a major influence on the selection of  which SOEs are permitted to 
internationalise, their impact on the degree of globalisation of such firms is more limited.  
Similarly, Cui and Jiang (2012) provide evidence that SOEs face stronger pressures of 
isomorphism to adapt to host country norms. Recent work suggests that strong institutional 
pressures faced by SCEs may result in them pursuing few acquisitions and accepting lower 
levels of control, than often assumed (Meyer et. al. 2014). 
In addition, in a number of economies the protectionist focus has been on particular classes of 
assets (strategic, security sensitive or those meeting national interest criteria) as opposed to 
targeting the type of investor (private, state owned or state affiliated). Understanding this 
policy preference would be useful in appreciating the dangers of global protectionism.  
Finally, our analysis has emphasised majority state ownership, characteristic of most SWFs 
and many SOEs. However, it would be useful to extent the analysis to consider the richer 
concept of 'varieties of state capitalism' where international investors enjoy a range of 
benefits stemming from state affiliation and not simply state ownership (Musacchio and 
Lazzarini 2012; Wang et. al. 2012). 
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